Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations of Legal Theory by Harrison, Jeffrey L.
University of Florida Levin College of Law
UF Law Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty Scholarship
Spring 1997
Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the
Obligations of Legal Theory
Jeffrey L. Harrison
University of Florida Levin College of Law, harrisonj@law.ufl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub
Part of the Legal History, Theory and Process Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at UF Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion
in Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of UF Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact outler@law.ufl.edu.
Recommended Citation
Jeffrey Lynch Harrison, Piercing Pareto Superiority: Real People and the Obligations of Legal Theory, 39 Ariz. L. Rev. 1 (1997), available at
http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/facultypub/446
Essays
PIERCING PARETO SUPERIORITY: REAL
PEOPLE AND THE OBLIGATIONS OF LEGAL
THEORY
Jeffrey L. Harrison*
There's a black man with a black cat living in a black
neighborhood
He's got an interstate running through his front yard
You know he thinks he's got it so good.'
I. INTRODUCTION
For over thirty years, law and economics have been viewed by many as
complementing each other. The match, however, has been an uneasy one.2 This
is most obvious in the way that law informs economics-it really does not. This
is not to say that economists do not learn by reading legal scholarship and
judicial opinions.3 In addition, economic analysis has been applied to virtually
every legal issue4 But the question is whether anything would be different
about the analytical properties of economics had it not been applied to law. This
seems doubtful.
On the other hand, it seems clear that economics does inform law with
respect to descriptive and empirical matters.5 Economics is, however, weakest
in exactly the areas of inquiry where law makes its most critical contributions.
Specifically, conventional law, as opposed to the "law of the jungle" or the laws
* Chesterfield Smith Professor of Law, The University of Florida. The author thanks
Sarah E. Wilson for her assistance. Copyright, Jeffrey L. Harrison, 1996.
1. JOHN COUGAR MELLENCAMP, Pink Houses, on UH-HUH (Riva Records 1983).
2. For a collection of essays describing this possible mismatch, see LAW AND
ECONOMICS: NEw AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES (Robin P. Mally & Christopher K. Braun
eds., 1995).
3. And, they enjoy many lucrative consulting and expert witness opportunities.
4. No footnote could hold a comprehensive list. For a baseline treatment of a multitude
of issues, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw (4th ed. 1992). Other
comprehensive approaches are found in DAVID W. BARNES & LYNN A. STOUT, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS (1992); ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS (1988); JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND ECONOMICS IN A NUTSHELL (1995).
5. Antitrust law is the best example of this but there are numerous other instances in
which economic principles have been applied by judges. See, e.g., Lake River Corp. v.
Carborundum Co., 769 F.2d 1284 (7th Cir. 1985); Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F.2d 558 (9th
Cir. 1974); Hill v. Mobile Auto Trim, Inc., 725 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1987); Gaito v. Auman, 318
S.E.2d 555 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984); Wassenaar v. Panos, 331 N.W.2d 357 (Wis. 1983).
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of microlegal systems, means the existence of a state that is constantly involved
in wealth and resource redistributions or conscious decisions not to affect these
redistributions. This means making rules that advantage some while
disadvantaging others. Economics is woefully inadequate at providing guidance
here.
To understand why economics is at a loss with respect to these matters,
take a closer look at the two basic limitations of economics. Start with the
assumption of rational self-interest. Does it apply in a context in which norms
and principles push people to do things that seem to make no sense if self-
interest is the only goal?6 It does not unless one makes use of "psychic income,"
of which there is evidently an unlimited supply.7 The use of "psychic income,"
however, in order to patch things up results in rational self-interest losing its
explanatory value.8 To many, it is clear that the traditional market-based
incentives of economics are often misplaced in the markets with which law and
economics is concerned.9
More serious is the limitation on interpersonal comparisons of utility.10
Because economics must and does steer clear of interpersonal comparisons of
utility, it really is of no help in determining when one distribution is better or
worse than another. Even the use of wealth-maximization or willingness to pay
does not help out here since the ability to assert oneself in the market may be
quite different than the utility associated with a change in position." Indeed,
without money one's preferences are irrelevant unless they are somehow
communicated through a third party.
The economist's answer to these limitations lies in the concept of Pareto
notions of efficiency. For present purposes, the most interesting of these
notions is Pareto Superiority. A reallocation is said to be Pareto Superior when
at least one person is made better off and no one is made worse off.12
Regardless of one's point of view as to how far a judicial system or government
should go in achieving distributive fairness, everyone would seem to agree that
reallocations that achieve a Pareto Superior state are desirable. This is not to
say different people would not choose one Pareto Superior move over another,
but simply that there would be no objections to reallocations that improve the
6. Some writers expressly exclude this type of behavior from their anaylsis. See Robert
Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1523, 1527 (1984); CHARLES J. GOETZ,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 4 (1984).
7. See FREDERIC L. PRYOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMY 95, n.27 (1977).
8. As Amartya Sen puts it: "[No matter whether you are a single-minded egoist or a
raving altruist or a class conscious militant, you will appear to be maximizing your own utility in
this enchanted world...." Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 323 (1977).
9. Some of these "markets" are the markets for breach of contract, carelessness and
criminal behavior. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits
of Law and Economics, 33 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1309 (1986); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An
Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. I
(1990).
10. This means the ability to compare one person's sense of loss or gain with that of
another.
11. See generally Anthony T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227 (1980).
12. Obviously, a reallocation is inferior (Pareto Inferior) if it makes at least one person
worse off, regardless of its impact on others. Finally, an allocation is Pareto optimal if there is
no allocation that can be made that does not make at least one person worse off.
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position of at least one person and do not make anyone worse off. While it is
clear that strict adherence to a Paretian standard means that governments can do
very little,13 Pareto Superiority can be seen as an explanation for why private
agreements are seen as both efficient and not unjust.14 They are efficient
because the overall level of welfare has increased. They also seem just because
all parties have consented. Pareto Superiority is one of the obvious concepts
that can complement legal decision-making. Its implications extend beyond
contract law, but that is the area in which its applications are most obvious.
This essay has-two purposes. The first is to demonstrate that the
appearance of mutual assent and Pareto Superiority are weak bases for
enforcing agreements. Pareto Superiority, as unassailable as it may seem, is
paper-thin and frequently based on illusions and a normatively meaningless
assessment of what it means to be "better off." The approach here is one of
"piercing Pareto Superiority" in order to examine the human factors that may
determine whether an agreement occurs and its distributive consequences.
Relative deprivation is the instrument used.15 The second purpose is to suggest
that it is the obligation of legal theory to take greater account of the
psychological and social factors that influence the process of agreement.
There is a subtheme that will be evident throughout. It deals with the
occasional inconsistency between the relatively benign-sounding notion of
cooperation, on one hand, and the conflict that occurs when one experiences a
sense of injustice. The point is that efficient outcomes or reallocations,
especially in the Paretian sense, require cooperation sufficient to permit
exchange.16 Passivity, advantage-taking, inequality, intimidation and subtle
forms of coercion can also be taken for the type of "cooperation" that is highly
consistent with efficiency. On the other hand, anger, disappointment, and
stubbornness may further desirable distributive outcomes. In short, there can be
a conflict between the spirit or the emotions associated with seeking the end of
maximizing joint utility or wealth and the spirit or emotions that accompany, or
may be required to assure, a fair distribution of the gain. Indeed, to one who
values fairness as much or more than efficiency, these seemingly "combative"
feelings may be constructive.
II. PARETO SUPERIORITY AND DEAL MAKING
What is questionable about a standard that leaves at least one person
13. Of course, there is the possibility of agreeing in advance to a type of government that
may take steps that require one to be made worse off for the benefit of others. It is possible that
this type of agreement might take place behind a Rawlsian "veil of ignorance."
14. The terms "not unjust' is used here to allow for the fact that there may, depending on
one's perspective, be different outcomes that would seem more just or fair.
15. There is a great deal more to be said about the importance of relative as opposed to
absolute comparisons in influencing decision making. See Richard H. McAdams, Relative
Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1 (1992). See also Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality,
Contract and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 445 (1994); Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Limits of Preference-Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 4 (1994).
16. The inclination of people to cooperate in order to achieve joint maximization is
evident in the number of exchanges that are made and has been demonstrated in some interesting
experiments. See, e.g., Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Sptizer, Entitlements, Rights and
Fairness: An Experimental Examination of Subjects' Concepts of Distributive Justice 14 J.
LEGAL STUD. 259 (1985); Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Sptizer, The Coase Theorem:
Some Experimental Tests, 25 J.L. & ECON. 73 (1982).
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better off and no one worse off? The starting point is not so much what it
means to be better off as it is who decides this. In economics the answer is
fairly simple; as rational maximizers of self-interest, individuals are rendered
almost incapable of doing anything that does not make them better off. How do
we know what it is that makes them better off? They reveal their preferences
through the choices they make. 17
A great deal has already been written about just how choices and
preferences are linked and whether choices reveal preferences.s That is not the
issue here. Instead, the beginning point for the analysis is to assume that what
people do in market or other choices really are consistent with their
preferences. In a sense, one could say that they know what they want and they
get what they want. In fact, even after the contract is made or the exchange
takes place, they would not desire to go back to the original state.
So what is it, under these ironclad conditions-a no-regret form of
Pareto Superiority-that should give us pause when using Pareto Superiority to
inform legal decisions? If law is to mean something independent of economics
in the matters of exchange, agreement, or contract-making, it is to look at what
makes agreement possible. There are two steps in any agreement. 19 The first is
discovering a potential exchange that will increase the well-being of both
parties. To a great extent this is a matter of overcoming transaction costs. The
second step is determining what will be viewed by both parties as a way to
fairly divide the gain from the exchange.20
These steps can be illustrated with the example of the "haggling yuppies."
Suppose Bob is in the market for a new car and being a proper academician sets
out on a quest for a Volvo station wagon. Before he embarks on his shopping
trip he, as academics often do, conducts a complete survey-probably while on
university time-of all consumer literature to get an idea of what prices would
be appropriate for specific models. Eventually, he locates what he considers a
perfect car-side air bags, built-in child seats, tasteful color, etc.-and his
research tells him that the value of that car is between $18,000 and $20,000. He
determines that the most he is willing to pay is $20,000. This is his reservation
price. Of course, he would prefer to pay less and plans to make an initial offer
of $18,000.
Let's suppose that Jane, the potential trading partner, is somewhat
desperate to sell her Volvo in order to raise money for her "summering" at the
Vineyard. Consequently, she anticipates being willing to take as little $18,000
for the car but has listed it at $20,000. Obviously, what this creates is an
opportunity for movement to a Pareto Superior state. Bob prefers the
automobile to anything else he could buy with his $20,000 and Jane prefers
17. See Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15
ECONOMVCA (n.s.) 243 (1948).
18. See, e.g., Harrison, supra note 9; Mark Kelman, Choice and Utility, 1979 Wisc. L.
REV. 769 (1979); Amos Tversky & Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: Preference Reverals, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1990, at 201.
19. See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trends and Traces: A Preliminary Evaluation of
Economic Analysis in Contract Law, 1988 ANN. SUR. AM. L. 73, 95-98.
20. Any issue that must be addressed in order to consummate the exchange may be fairly
called a transaction cost. The cost addressed here is associated with an internal and personal
sense of fairness. It is not called a transaction cost because it goes beyond the usual search and
negotiation costs.
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$18,000 to continued possession of the car.
Everything else would seem to be self-executing; the only issue is what
price between $18,000 and $20,000 will be the selling price. Is it possible that
the decision about price could undermine what appears to be a movement to a
more efficient allocation? In this simple example, probably not. But what
happens if Bob and Jane become real people-people with a context. Suppose
there is some initial small talk before negotiating about the car and it is
revealed that the car was given to Jane by her wealthy uncle. It is also revealed
that Bob is a law professor and, to Jane, this translates to "greedy," and "well-
paid." Both parties have seen the consumer information suggesting that the car
has a fair market value of $18,000 to $20,000. Jane may feel that any price
lower than $20,000 is tantamount to a gift from her to Bob. On the other hand,
Bob may feel that, given that Jane is in a hurry to sell and did not pay for the
car in the first place, any price above $18,000 is a gift from him to Jane. It may
be that neither party changes his or her valuation of the car itself, but all along
both desired the exchange and a sense of having been treated fairly. Although
this particular exchange may still take place, to the extent considerations of
"compensatory justice" 21 begin to play a role, the transaction may be delayed-
or the opportunity even lost.
The haggling yuppie example raises the issue of whether the quest for
fairness can get in the way of efficiency.22 This question has been addressed
relatively recently, and it is clear that in many circumstances people behave as
though achieving a sense of fairness may be a necessary condition for entering
into an agreement that otherwise would seem to increase their wealth. 23 The
issue is illustrated by a question posed in two forms by Richard Thaler, one of
the pioneers in the intriguing area of study devoted to linking economic theory
to actual human behavior:
You are lying on the beach on a hot day. All you have to drink is ice
water. For the last hour you have been thinking about how much you
would enjoy a nice cold bottle of your favorite brand of beer. A
companion gets up to go make a phone call and offers to bring back a
beer from the only nearby place where beer is sold (a fancy resort hotel)
[a small run-down grocery store]. He says that the beer might be
expensive and so asks how much you are willing to pay for the beer. He
says that he will buy the beer if it costs as much or less than the price
you state. But if it costs more than the price you state he will not buy it.
You trust your friend, and there is no possibility of bargaining with the(bartender) [store owner]. What price do you tell him?24
21. The term "compensatory justice" is used in Michel Rosenfeld, Contract and Justice:
The Relation Between Classical Contract Law and Social Contract Theory, 70 IOWA L. REV.
769, 780 (1985). I am not sure the term is used to mean the same thing here but it seems
reasonably close. Here it is limited to a sense of being treated fairly in the context of an
exchange.
22. I realize that the "psychic income" disciples will simply say that I have added an
additional item-fairness or a sense of compensatory justice-to the utility functions of the
parties and, therefore, their possible inability to agree just means that they were unable to find a
solution that left at least one of them better off while no one was worse off. I think the point to
be made is still relevant to those adopting this view although it may require an application of a
little "psychic energy" to make the necessary translations.
23. Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting and Consumer Choice, 4 MARKETING SCI.
199, 206 (1985). See also RICHARD H. THALER, THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND
ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC LIFE 21-35 (1992).
24. THALER, supra note 23, at 21-35.
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In Thaler's experiment, the median price for those who saw themselves
as buying the beer from the resort was $2.65. Those who were given the run-
down store version were willing to pay a median price of $1.50.25 What this
suggests is that the decision does not simply involve the exchange of a certain
amount of money (and foregone alternative purchasing opportunities) for a
beer but the additional element of what is a fair price.2 6
Thaler's beer question is an example of what is called the "ultimatum
game."27 In its more bare-bones version it takes the form of giving a certain
amount of money to one party. He or she must get the permission of another
party to keep the money and this permission can be bought by making a one-
time offer to the potential permission-giver of some portion of the money. If
no permission is given, neither party gets to keep any of the money. Suppose
the sum initially allocated is $10.00. Presumably, the rational maximizer of
self-interest would offer the permission giver one cent or some other small
amount and keep $9.99, and the permission-giver would find one cent
acceptable. This would mean both parties are better off. The alternative of not
granting the permission means that both parties are worse off.28 Yet, typically
more than the bare minimum is offered and offers that are close to the bare
minimum are often rejected.29 In short, parties are willing to sacrifice an
opportunity to be "better off' in a material sense in order to avoid being treated
in a way that they perceive as unfair. One way of putting it is that they are
willing to pay for fairness by passing up material gain.
There are two ways to explain the outcomes of these experiments. One is
to say that potentially Pareto Superior outcomes are thwarted by the selfishness
and irrationality of the parties; they cut off their noses to spite their faces. A
second view is that a sense of "compensatory justice" is likely to be part of an
individual's utility function and exchanges that are rejected are those that would
not have increased utility although they might have increased material well-
being. Regardless of how it is viewed, it seems clear that people differ in what
they expect or find acceptable in an exchange, and it is important that two
parties be compatible in this regard for the bargain to take place.
For example, in the case of the haggling yuppies, the car may or may not
be sold. It depends on whether, despite their different views of the
circumstances, they can locate some area of distributive compatibility. One
possibility is that they will not find a price that both find acceptable due to both
of their high expectations about what constitutes being treated fairly. On the
other hand, they may. Either way, it is hard to view the issue as one that law
should account for.
But consider another case-this time the real case of Jones v. Star Credit
25. Thaler,4supra note 23, at 206.
26. Id. at 207. See also Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of
Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285 (1986) [hereinafter Kahneman et al., Fairness and the
Assumptions of Economics]; Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking; Entitlements in the Market, 76 AMER. ECON. REV. 728 (1986) [hereinafter Kahneman
et al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking]; Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The
Ultimatum Game, J. ECON. PERSP., Fall 1988, at 195.
27. See Werner Goth et al., An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 367 (1982).
28. For a survey of variations on this theme, see THALER, supra note 23.
29. See Kahneman et al., Fairness and the Assumptions of Economics, supra note 26, at
S288-92.
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Corp.30 Here the plaintiffs, characterized by the court as "welfare recipients," 31
purchased a home freezer for $900 from Your Shop At Home Service, Inc.
When this was added to various other credit and insurance charges, the total
price was $1234.80. According to the appellate court, it had been established at
trial that the freezer had a "maximum retail value of $300."32 If one adopts the
standard notion of Pareto Superiority, it is hard not to conclude that the
"cooperation" between the Joneses and Your Shop At Home Service, Inc. had a
desired outcome. Unless expressed preferences are misleading, the Joneses
preferred the freezer to whatever else could be purchased with $1200 and the
Your Shop At Home preferred the money to keeping the freezer. This is not to
say that the Joneses would not have preferred to buy the freezer at a lower
price, but that is a different issue and no different from the fact that Your Shop
At Home would have preferred to sell the freezer for $2,000.
These are distributive issues and achieving a different distributive
outcome in this context would have required the Joneses to be less
"cooperative." One might wonder whether either of the battling yuppies would
have been as "cooperative" as the Joneses. Of course, to say the parties
"cooperated" seems out of place in this context and the court did, without
finding that there was any fraud involved, find the bargain inconsistent with the
"moral sense of the community." 33
In another example, Allied Van Lines, Inc. v. Bratton,34 Bratton, a
woman, contracted with Allied Van Lines to have her household goods shipped.
When the movers-men-picked up her possessions, she was asked to sign a
bill of lading limiting the carriers' liability to $1.25 per pound. After the
property was destroyed, she sought not to be limited to the $1.25 per pound
under the theory of "mistake" and "lack of assent."35 The trial court held for
Bratton and was reversed by the Supreme Court of Florida. Most interesting is
a short excerpt of trial testimony concerning the circumstances of Bratton's
"assent."
Q: Did anyone prevent you or stop you from reading the bill of lading?
A: No.
Q: Did anyone say anything to you that you took to be an inducement
not to read it?
A: No. Like I said before, the house was really cold; and the men were
tired. They were in a hurry to get out.36
Here we have another version of "cooperation" leading to a Pareto
Superior outcome. Again, there seems to be little duress in a traditional sense,
but there is an obvious discomfort with raising an issue with the movers that
might result in a different distributive outcome. This could be the result of any
number of factors, but the easiest to spot is that she prefers to be
accommodating. In fact, one could say that the accommodations of others or the
avoidance of conflict is something from which she derives utility. It is not clear
30. 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
31. Id at 265. The court also suggests that the plaintiffs were "poor and illiterate." Id. at
266.
32. Id. at 265.
33. Id. at 266.
34. 351 So. 2d 344 (Fla. 1977).
35. Id. at 346.
36. Id. at 346 n.3.
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that it is accurate to attribute this to gender,37 but what does seem relatively
safe to say is that an accommodating person dealing with a non-accommodating
person will likely receive a smaller share of the gain from the exchange.
Another possibility that may be only subtly different than the first is that
Bratton's internal sense of fairness and compensatory justice meant that she felt
the men deserved to be left alone. That is, they had worked hard all day, it was
late, cold, and getting dark. They wanted to leave. She felt it was unfair for
them to exert any more energy to the task of her move given what she imagined
their likely compensation would be.
Less benign is the final possibility that she finds herself in an empty
house with two or more powerful and impatient men who are complaining
about the cold and darkness. The phone has been disconnected and, whatever
her decision, the fact is that they now do possess her belongings and should a
disagreement arise, there is virtually no way the outcome will be very
satisfactory. All of these possibilities could be equated with being cooperative.
It is just as likely to characterize them as examples of intimidation, weakness,
passivity, or unassertiveness.
To complete this survey of "cooperation" and deal-making possibilities,
it is useful to look at the empirical results of two car-shopping experiments
conducted by Ian Ayres. 38 In two different exercises, Ayres studied the initial
and final offers of automobile sellers to shoppers who differed by gender and
race.39 Although Ayres' results varied, one critical factor remained the same:
black shoppers, both men and women, were consistently made higher initial and
final offers.40
It is tempting to attribute these outcomes to racial animus and, from a
socio-historical perspective, these differences probably ultimately can be traced
to a variety of factors including racial animus.41 From a more current
perspective the issue remains, why would sellers-black and white-take the
risk of losing profitable sales by consistently making higher initial offers to
black shoppers? Two factors seem to play an important role-both dealing with
what sellers expect to be true about minority buyers. The first is the belief that
some shoppers as a group may find the process of bargaining more costly.
37. See Dawn lacobucci & Amy Ostrom, Gender Differences in the Impact of Core and
Relational Aspects of Services on the Evaluation of Service Encounters, 2 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 257 (1993).
38. Ian Ayres, Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations,
104 HARV. L. REV. 817 (1991) [hereinafter Ayres, Fair Driving]; Ian Ayres, Further Evidence
of Discrimination in New Car Negotiations and Estimates of Its Cause, 94 MICH. L. REV. 109
(1995) [hereinafter Ayres, Further Evidence].
39. Great efforts were made to make the shoppers appear otherwise "fungible." Ayres,
Fair Driving, supra note 38, at 825-26. More interesting than Ayres' conclusions with respect to
final offers are his findings with respect to initial offers. In his initial studies there seemed to be a
possibility that the final offer findings were tainted by a research methodology regarding
bargaining strategy that essentially locked shoppers into the initial offers. This strategy required
shoppers to respond with a "split the difference" counter-offer. Subsequent studies employing
both a split the difference approach and one that required shoppers to counter-offer in fixed
increments indicate that the bargaining strategy did not significantly affect the outcome. Ayres,
Further Evidence, supra note 38, at 118-19.
40. Ayres, Further Evidence, supra note 38, at 109.
41. Ayres' results suggest that black shoppers did as poorly with minority owned
dealerships and minority sales personnel as they did with white owners and sales personnel. Id.
at 135-36.
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Obviously, if the salesperson's belief is correct, the high-cost bargainor will
agree to buy at a higher price. Ayres concluded that this factor could explain
the higher prices offered to black women.42 The second factor is the sellers'
assumptions about the highest price buyers are willing to pay. Here, Ayres
found that sellers believed, for example, that black males would pay more than
white males, and acted accordingly with respect to initial and final offers.43
Presumably this belief has some basis in fact or profit-maximizing sellers
would alter their approaches to bargaining with the currently relatively
disfavored buyers.
Now consider all of these examples together. What do the yuppies
haggling over a couple of thousand dollars have in common with the poor
shoppers who pay three times the average retail price for a freezer; the possibly
intimidated woman signing the form in a dark, empty, and cold house; and the
likely systematic discrimination against minorities when purchasing
automobiles? In all cases, the final bargain increased the welfare of both
parties. Moreover, it is a result of their cooperation. This is the economic
interpretation. And, in fairness, it is the economic interpretation because that is
as far as economics as a discipline can go. It does not hold itself out as offering
normative assessments.
One could just as easily note that all of these examples of "cooperation,"
except perhaps that of the haggling yuppies, are really examples of
overreaching, advantage-taking, exploitation, intimidation, passivity or subtle
duress. And, in each instance, again putting aside the yuppies, there is an
overreaching party and a party who has acquiesced, there is an advantage-taker
and the disadvantaged, and there is the coercive party and the coerced party.
Unlike the ideal view of deal making in which cooperation means that two
parties meet on equal footing to effect an exchange, the examples posed here
may be instances in which the exchange and the resulting efficiency requires
that there be imbalances in power or at least personality differences. In fact,
consider the result if the Joneses, Bratton and minority car shoppers act like the
ultimatum game player who turns down an increase in his or her material well-
being in order to avoid participating in an unfair division of the gain from the
exchange. Their lack of cooperation or rebellion may mean going without the
freezer, the approval of the movers, or an automobile, respectively. The
outcome is that Pareto Superior moves that were available had they cooperated
are lost. Their sense of dignity is preserved at the expense of increased material
well-being.
Of course, economics has an easy response to the possibility of foregone
Pareto Superior moves. Through the use of "psychic income," the argument
would be that those Pareto Superior possibilities were anything but that. In fact,
as soon as a potential contracting party developed a sense of compensatory
justice that prevents the making of the bargain, the bargain is not one that
would have enhanced the position of both parties in the first place. Thus, even
in the ultimatum game experiments, one cannot say the choice of turning down
an offer and receiving nothing is irrational or inconsistent with Paretian
concepts of efficiency.
All of this is good enough for economics because economics makes no
42. Id. at 137.
43. Id. at 138.
1997]
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW
claim to having more to say about these issues other than describing them.44
Unless law is simple economics dressed up with the patina of morality, this is
not sufficient for a law-based response. Instead, legal theory must at least
address the dilemma that is presented. The choice is between legitimizing
lopsided bargains that may perpetuate societal imbalances and which are
arguably the result of revealed preferences and in the interest of efficiency or,
through one means or another, delegitimizing the same outcomes. 45 On its face,
it may seem like a simple choice between allocative and distributional goals.
For legal theory and practical purposes, it is far more than that. The issue is: do
you leave people as you find them or do you begin the process of determining
just what accounts for their preferences, the differences in what they find
compensatorily just, and the legitimacy of these differences? If these factors are
dependent upon and perpetuated by law, then law, because it lays claim to a
moral or normative component, must push the analysis another step and look
inside Pareto Superiority.
To do this law must look to psychology, sociology, anthropology and,
possibly, biology in order to understand its own impact on the ordering of
preferences. In the next section, a part of this process is suggested by discussing
the huge implications of relative deprivation theory for law. The analysis
focuses on relative deprivation because it appears to hold a key to how people
form their notions of what is and what is not compensatorily just.46
M. RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND LEGAL RELATIONSHIPS
Close attention to "relative deprivation" grew out of observations of
military personnel during the 1940s. One of the earliest and most well-known
studies found that higher-ranking officers with more privileges were more
dissatisfied than military police with fewer privileges. 47 The basic teaching is
that a feeling of satisfaction or dissatisfaction is not a simple function of how
one is treated as an absolute matter but of how one fares relative to
expectations. For example, a more recent study indicates that company
presidents are more likely to be dissatisfied than first-line supervisors earning
one-fourth their salary.48 As a corollary, what people are willing to ask for and
44. Although those who apply economics to law sometimes want to push economics a bit
further. See RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE (1981).
45. There are many ways of doing this including the use of the doctrine of
unconscionability, as in Star v. Jones. Laws dealing with capacity as well as a fair amount of
consumer protection legislation can be viewed as furthering this interest.
46. My emphasis on relative deprivation is symbolic of a disagreement I have with the
conventional wisdom. The conventional wisdom is that markets should be permitted to maximize
wealth and redistributions, if any, should be the result of tax and transfer payments. This makes
sense but misses the point that a system of redistribution based solely on tax and transfer
payments is unlikely to allow people to break out of dependent relationships within the market so
as to create their own interpersonal redistributions.
47. SAMUEL A. STOUFFER Er AL., THE AMERICAN SOLDIER: ADJUSTMENT DURING
ARMY LIFE (1949). See generally Harrison, supra note 15, at 460-62; McAdams, supra note
15, at 34-37; Faye Crosby & A. Miren Gonzalez-Intal, Relative Deprivation and Equity
Theories: Felt Injustice and the Undeserved Benefits of Others, in THE SENSE OF INJUSTICE:
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 141 (Robert G. Folger ed., 1984).
48. Edward E. Lawler III & Lyman W. Porter, Perceptions Regarding Management
Compensation, 3 INDUS. REL. 41, 46-48 (1963). See also Ronny Lindstrom & Will H. Moore,
Deprived, Rational or Both? 'Why Minorities Rebel' Revisited, 23 J. POL. & MIL. SOC. 167
(1995); James M. Olson et al., The Preconditions and Consequences of Relative Deprivation:
Two Field Studies, 25 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 944 n. 11 (1995).
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get is linked to their expectations. Put simply, the person-military police
officer, freezer or car buyers, or moving company client-who feels no
deprivation is unlikely to ask for more of whatever is at stake.
A formal exposition of relative deprivation includes the following five
conditions.
1. Someone else has X.
2. The subject wants X.
3. The subject feels deserving of X.
4. The subject believes obtaining X is possible.
5. The subject does not feel personally responsible for not having X.49
This list can be narrowed to wanting X and feeling that X is deserved
because items 4 and 5 really deal with the individual's sense of dessert.50 At
heart, relative deprivation involves the process of a person comparing his or
her situation, and concluding that he or she is as deserving as the other.5 1
Typically, this is a matter of comparing oneself with a selected reference
group, but there are other bases of comparison as well.52
One need look no further than the work of Ayres, discussed above, for
how the sense of deprivation or lack thereof may manifest itself. For example,
one could attempt to explain the results of his experiments either by a lack of
seller information 53 or by intense racial hatred directed at blacks by both blacks
and whites. Neither of these possibilities seems likely and neither is supported
by Ayres' research. 54 Much more likely is the possibility that buyer
expectations are critical in determining the outcome. 55 If one feels that it is
unfair for blacks to pay hundreds of dollars more for automobiles than whites
or for "uneducated" people to pay $1200 for a $300 freezer because their
expectations mean that those results are viewed as legitimate, 56 the source of
49. See Faye Crosby, A Model of Egotistical Relative Deprivation, 83 PSYCHOL. REV.
85 (1976).
50. Olson et al., supra note 48, at 945; Faye Crosby et al., Relative Deprivation and
Explanation: Models and Concepts, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION & SOCIAL COMPARISON, 4
THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 17 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986).
51. "Equity theory" is a construct that also seems to explain how people form views of
fairness. The standard formulation is that people compare the ratio of their "outcomes" to
"inputs" with the same ratio for others. When the ratios are equal, a sense of fairness is
experienced. See J. Stacy Adams, Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN
EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965). Equity theory and
relative deprivation theory are different in a number of respects but share the importance of social
comparisons. They differ in that the sources of a sense of injustice, in relative deprivation, is
broader than in equity theory. See Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, supra note 47, at 141-53. See
generally Joanne Martin, The Tolerance of Injustice, in RELATIVE DEPRIVATION AND SOCIAL
COMPARISON, 4 The Ontario Symposium 217 (James M. Olson et al. eds., 1986). Kenneth A.
Rasinski, What's Fair is Fair-Or is It? Value Differences Underlying Public Views About
Social Justice, 53 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 201 (1987).
5 2. See Crosby & Gonzalez-Intal, supra note 47, at 153.
53. This would mean, in the context of the experiments, that sellers assumed black
buyers were ignorant of how far the price could be cut and remain profitable.
54. See generally Ayres, Further Evidence, supra note 38, at 124-28.
55. There is probably no single correct way of stating this proposition. In effect, sellers
rely on what they believe to be the expectations of at least a sufficient number of buyers within a
group to make adherence to a high price profitable. Id. at 126, 138.
5 6. It is tempting and perhaps too simplistic to attribute these differences to "information
problems." Even the willingness to invest in information development presumes a sense that an
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that unfairness may lie in the lack of development of a sense of relative
deprivation.
Merely stating that those who experience a sense of deprivation are likely
to demand and get more of whatever is at stake just leads to a more critical
question: Are the reasons for this sense of deprivation or lack thereof "valid"?
Making the distinction between "valid" and "invalid" is the job of legal theorists
and, lest anyone think this is some kind of bold statement, this is already the job
claimed by legal theory in areas ranging from contracts to torts to
constitutional interpretation. Here, though, "validity" or "invalidity" turns on
the sources of one's expectations.
For example, suppose a black employee in 1950 earns $3.00 an hour and
his white counterpart earns $4.00 an hour. With full knowledge of the
discrepancy, the black employee feels no sense of deprivation because he
compares himself to other black workers only. This example can be turned
around. Suppose a white worker in the same context is paid the black wage of
$3.00 per hour. She is no more productive than any other worker-black or
white-but becomes outraged because she compares herself to white workers
only. Is either the "sense of deprivation" of the white woman or the black
employee's "satisfaction" based on valid reasons? This is not a question that
conventional or any version of economics purports to answer.
If, however, legal theory is to mean anything, it must address the issue of
validity. It is hard to see how any serious attempt to do so does not necessitate
reference to social, behavioral and other sciences, in order to understand the
factors that determine one's capacity to sense unfairness and react to it. In doing
so, there are some provocative twists and turns to account for. First, it is again
important to note that the fact that others have something-a high salary, a nice
home, etc., does not create a sense of deprivation unless one feels that they too
"deserve" whatever is at stake. Thus, some people just seem to have a "sense of
entitlement" that results in an almost continuous belief that they are deserving
of almost anything57 while others seem inclined to accept the status quo as being
what is fair.58 What can be stated with some confidence is that an individual's
self-esteem helps determine his or her capacity to feel deprived. For example,
low self-esteem is ofttimes related to a sense of responsibility for poor
outcomes. 59 Under the five-item list above, a sense that one is responsible for
his or her situation will work against the development of a sense of relative
deprivation. As an issue of moral or legal legitimacy, there seems to be little
basis for saying that a willingness to take less due to low self-esteem is a "valid
reason." Nor does the fact that one comes from a privileged background and
has been "taught" he or she need not ever settle for less seem to fit the category
of a "valid reason."
There is another twist to the process. How does an individual decide the
improvement is possible and also a risk-taking aggressive attitude.
57. See Harrison, supra note 15, at 447.
5 8. See L. Richard Della Fave, The Meek Shall Not Inherit the Earth: Self-Evaluation
and the Legitimacy of Stratification, 45 AM. SOC. REV. 955 (1980); Karen S. Cook,
Expectations, Evaluations and Equity, 40 AM. Soc. REV. 372 (1975).
59. The precise mechanism is not hard to imagine. Low self-esteem means a lower level
of self love and a tendency therefore to blame oneself. See generally RICHARD SENNETT &
JONATHAN COBB, THE HIDDEN INJURIES OF CLASS 20,28, 249-50 (1972); Della Fave, supra
note 58, at 962.
[Vol. 39:1
PIERCING PARETO SUPERIORITY
relevant reference point? Why would a poor person select other poor people or
a black person select only members of a black community? One possibility is to
preserve one's psychological well-being. To use a different basis can produce a
sense of deprivation and dissonance which can also result in frustration, anger,
and sanctions if one is seen as stepping outside his or her class or group.60
Recognizing one's worth can be liberating, but it can also be painful. 61 At a
subconscious level, it may be important simply to avoid the pain associated with
a lack of "cooperation."
A final twist comes from addressing the role of law in the process of
forming expectations. There are two angles to take here. The first and
narrower is that it is the role of law to evaluate the validity of one's reasons for
satisfaction or deprivation. 62 The second is to recognize the tremendous
influence law has in shaping the expectations that lead to these feelings. For
example, the court in Jones v. Star Credit upheld a finding that the sale of the
$300 freezer for over $1200 was unconscionable. 63 Aside from any other
impact, the outcome of this type of decision can be to create in the victorious
party a sense that the law has endorsed his or her sense of unfairness, or it has
taken a step toward assisting them in developing this sense of injustice. Thus, to
the extent that the original result may be connected to a fear of asserting
oneself, the decision could even be viewed as therapeutic. 64
Similarly, legislative efforts in recent years to increase opportunities for
members of minority groups may have a similar therapeutic effect on the group
or individuals.65 This may work through the affirmation of all people and a
"lesson" that people are of equal moral worth. To the extent this lesson is taken
to heart, the effect of these laws will be to create an increased likelihood of a
sense of relative deprivation. Interestingly, this may diminish the "cooperative
spirit" that may be seen as consistent with Pareto Superior outcomes and result
in less "pliable" people, frustration, and disagreement. Finally, the first few
times employers or managers are penalized for sexual harassment or racial
discrimination, they may experience a tremendous sense of frustration
primarily by relying on the past as the basis for comparison. Eventually,
however, as these practices are delegitimized, the sense of deprivation or
injustice will most likely wane.
This is not to say that relative deprivation, including that which results
from the teachings of law, can be equated with "valid reasons." As noted above,
60. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1152 (1986); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION
OF RATIONALITY 145 (1983).
61. See generally Morton Deutsch, Awaking the Sense of Injustice, in THE QUEST FOR
JUSTICE: MYTH, REALITY, IDEAL 19 (Melvin J. Lerner & Michael Ross eds., 1974).
62. Decisions in contract law about duress, unconscionability, breach, etc., all go to the
"validity" of one's disappointments.
63. 298 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (Sup. Ct. 1969).
64. See Harrison, supra note 15, at 496. See generally DAVID B. WEXLER & BRUCE J.
WINICK, ESSAYS IN THERAPEUTIC JURISPRUDENCE (1991); Christopher Slobogin,
Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Five Dilemmas to Ponder, 1 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL'Y & L. 193
(1995).
65. Relative deprivation can be individualized or fraternal. In the latter case, the reaction
can be one that seeks to elevate the position of an entire group. See Joanne Martin, Relative
Deprivation: A Theory of Distributive Injustice for an Era of Shrinking Resources, in 3
RESEARCH IN ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR 53, 60-67 (L.L. Cummings & Barry M. Staw
eds., 1981).
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whether informed by overly affirming parenting or legislation, some people
may sense injustice where there is none. For example, suppose the white woman
worker described above, who is making $3.00 per hour, is not as productive as
anyone else. She may perceive every difference she experiences in society as a
result of gender discrimination, not that she needs to work harder. Her
newfound sense of entitlement may rule out even addressing the question of
"valid reasons" in a constructive manner. On the other hand, some people may
engage in self-evaluations that only rarely result in forming this sense of
deprivation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the writings of the past thirty years, there remains a question of
the extent to which law and economics are complementary disciplines. This
question is especially critical when one focuses on the importance of law as a
determinant of distributive outcomes. Pareto Superiority would appear,
however, to be a concept that at some basic level unites the two areas of study.
Although one might prefer a different distributive impact, it seems hard not to
accept that an exchange that leaves at least one person better off and no one
worse off is at worst unobjectionable. The issue, though, is one of determining
what sorts of things go into the sense of being "better off." This requires
piercing Pareto Superiority to determine the legitimacy of the factors that
result in a sense of justice or a sense of injustice or deprivation. Economics is
of very limited use in this analysis.66 Legal analysis, if it is to be anything other
than an empty vessel, must draw on the teachings of psychology, sociology and
other fields in order to engage in this inquiry. 67 Unlike economics, the
appearance of mutual assent is only the beginning of this analysis.68 Indeed, one
of the outcomes of legal analysis may be the realization of the value of conflict
and disagreement as a means to achieving just, as opposed to merely efficient,
outcomes.
The process is complicated by the fact that law, in all of its forms, helps
shape the expectations of people. The law is not merely a reaction to injustice
but creates standards by which individuals may feel wronged. Thus, law is not
merely reactive; it informs, shapes, and teaches. In this sense it can play the
role of creating in those less advantaged a sense of deprivation that is required
for the type of assertive autonomy that permits individuals to liberate
themselves.
66. Economics retains some of its usefulness here for descriptive purposes.
67. See, e.g., Paul J. Albanese, The Nature of Preferences: An Exploration of the
Relationship Between Economics and Psychology, 8 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 3 (1987).
68. Obviously, law and legislation range far beyond allocations that achieve Pareto
Superior outcomes. The analysis here focuses on the process of agreeing to exchanges.
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